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Abstract—Many kinds of communication networks, in par-
ticular social and opportunistic networks, rely at least partly
on on humans to help move data across the network. Human
altruistic behavior is an important factor determining the fea-
sibility of such a system. In this paper, we study the impact of
different distributions of altruism on the throughput and delay
of mobile social communication system. We evaluate the system
performance using four experimental human mobility traces with
uniform and community-biased traffic patterns. We found that
mobile social networks are very robust to the distributions of
altruism due to the nature of multiple paths. We further confirm
the results by simulations on two popular social network models.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first complete study of
the impact of altruism on mobile social networks, including the
impact of topologies and traffic patterns.
I. INTRODUCTION
We envision a future in which a multitude of devices carried
by people are dynamically networked. We aim to build Pocket
Switched Networks (PSN) [4] [11] for such environments. A
PSN is a type of Delay Tolerant Networks (DTN) [8] which
uses contact opportunities (hence the name “opportunistic
network”) to allow humans to communicate without network
infrastructure. PSNs rely on devices carried by humans to relay
messages for others. In wireless environments, especially for
small hand-held devices, battery life is a major concern and
hence relaying messages for others may require altruistic be-
havior. Since humans constitute the network, human altruistic
behavior impacts the throughput of the communication system.
It is an important factor in the feasibility of a PSN, but we
found that the study of this area was conspicuously missing
in the literature to date.
In this paper, we aim to give a systematic study of the
impact of altruism on communication, particularly on oppor-
tunistic networks, but we expect our results to be applicable
to other social networks. In particular, we look at how robust
an opportunistic network is under different distributions of
altruism in the population. For the communication model, we
use different traffic patterns. We assume each node on the
network can create messages for any other, but with differing
probabilities. For an ecological community, correlated interac-
tion means that an organism of a given type is more likely to
interact with another organism of the same type than with a
randomly chosen member of the population [18]. This corre-
lated interaction is also applicable to human communication
patterns, and people in the same community may talk to each
∗ Pan Hui was in Cambridge when he conducted this work.
other more often than to people in other communities. We
believe these community-biased communication patterns also
limit the impact of altruism (or selfishness) on the system, and
hence we are interested in investigating it.
To account for human mobility, we evaluate the system
throughput using four real traces gathered by two research
projects. We find that both information dissemination on both
these kind of mobile social networks is very robust towards
different forms of altruism distribution, largely because of
multiple-path nature. The system can have around 90 percent
throughput of the original all-altruistic system, whether with
uniform, normal, or degree-biased altruism distribution. We
also find that community-biased traffic pattern can further in-
crease the robustness of the system. To confirm the generality
of this result, we established the same findings with two widely
used social models that are available [21] [13].
The rest of the paper is organised as following: experimental
datasets (Section II), altruism and traffic models (Section III),
results and evaluations of dynamics networks (Section IV),
evaluation using static social networks (Section V), related
work (Section VI), and conclusions (Section VII).
II. MOBILE SOCIAL EXPERIMENTS
In this paper, we use three experimental datasets gathered
by the Haggle Project 1 over two years, referred to as Cam-
bridge, Infocom05, and Infocom06; and one dataset from the
MIT Reality Mining Project [7], referred to as Reality. In
Cambridge, iMotes were distributed mainly to two groups of
students from University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory,
specifically undergraduate Year 1 and Year 2 students, and also
some PhD and Masters students. In Infocom05, mobile devices
were distributed to approximately fifty students attending the
Infocom student workshop. In Infocom06, the scenario was
very similar to Infocom05 except that the scale is larger, with
80 participants. Participants were selected so that 34 out of
80 form four subgroups by academic affiliations. In Reality,
100 smart phones were deployed to students and staff at
MIT over a period of 9 months. These phones ran software
that logged contacts with other Bluetooth-enabled devices by
doing Bluetooth device discovery every five minutes. The four
experiments are summarised in Table I. The characteristics of
these datasets, such as inter-contact and contact distribution,
have been explored in several previous studies [4] [12]. We
1http://www.haggleproject.org
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TABLE I
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FOUR EXPERIMENTAL DATA SETS
believe these four datasets cover a rich diversity of environ-
ments from busy metropolitan city (Infocom06 in Barcelona)
to quiet university town (Cambridge), with an experimental
period from several days (Infocom05) to almost one year
(Reality).
For the simulation evaluation, we developed a simulator
called HaggleSim, which can replay the collected mobility
traces, and simulate different forwarding strategies on every
contact event. This simulator is completely driven by contact
events. The original trace file is divided into discrete sequential
contact events, and fed into the simulator as input. In all the
simulations in this work, we divided the trace into discrete
contact events with a granularity of 100 seconds.
III. ALTRUISM AND TRAFFIC MODELS
A. Altruism Models
Altruism is observed in many aspects of the modern so-
cieties and also exhibited by hunter-gatherers, who typically
have dense networks of exchange relations, food-sharing, co-
operative hunting, and collective warfare. Human altruism has
been intensively studied [9] [10] [18]. In general, each node
(or person) can have different altruism values with respect to
other nodes (or people). Here we examine several altruism
distributions, including a fixed percentage of selfish nodes,
and uniform, normal, and geometric distributions of altruistic
values for the whole population. All altruism values are
distributed between 0 and 1, where 0 stands for totally selfish
and 1 stands for totally altruistic. (In the literature [5][15],
altruism values are usually modeled as between −1 and 1,
where −1 stands for totally spiteful2, but we will not consider
spiteful behavior in this study.)
• Percentage of Selfishness, the percentage of selfish nodes
varies between 0 and 100, and the other nodes are totally
altruistic. This is the simplest altruism distribution, but
we know in reality a node will usually not be totally
selfish or altruistic.
• Uniform Distribution, the altruistic value of the whole
population is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. Uni-
form and normal are distributions popularly encountered
in nature and can be possible models for altruism.
• Normal Distribution, the altruistic value of the whole
population follows the normal distribution with the values
normalised to between 0 and 1. Since the range of a
normal distribution is from negative infinity to positive
infinity, in order to be able to normalise, we adopted 5%
and 95% of its Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF)
2Sometimes termed Byzantine in systems literature
value as two cutoffs in the negative and the positive
directions of its distribution function. For example, if the
value of the cutoffs at the 5% point is −10 and at the
95% point is 10, all results will be incremented by 10
and then divided by 10− (−10) = 20.
• Geometric Distribution, the altruistic values are cal-
culated per-node pair, and each follows a distribution
such that the probability decreases with the social hop-
distance, k, in the following way: P (X = k) = (1 −
p)(1−k)∗p, where p is the altruism value for the first hop.
In order to guarantee that the maximum altruism value is
1, we normalise the altruism values against the parameter
p. In real life, altruism also decreases from kinship (first
hop) to farther away of the social graph [16].
• Degree-biased Distribution, relates the altruism to the
node degree as follows:
ai =
(ki − kmin)α
(kmax − kmin)α
with α > 0 (1)
where kmin and kmax are respectively the smallest and
the largest degrees in the network. With this formula,
independently of the value of α, we have ai = 0 for
ki = kmin, and ai = 1 for ki = kmax, that is the node
with lowest degree always has a = 0, while the hub has
a = 1. When α = 1 the value of a grows linearly with the
degree, while α > 1 (0 < α < 1) indicates respectively
a superlinear (sublinear) dependence of a from k. Notice
that, when α = 0 all nodes have the same altruism a = 1.
The scenario for this model is that in the social network,
people become popular and have many friends because
they are more willing to help other people. If we want to
have ai = 1 for ki = kmin, and ai = 0 for ki = kmax,
that is the node with the lowest degree always has a = 1,
while the hub has a = 0 we need to use instead:
ai =
(kmax − ki)α
(kmax − kmin)α
with α > 0 (2)
The scenario for this is that in social network if a person
has too many friends, he may not have enough resource
to help all of them, while a person with only one single
friend will probably be very willing to help out this
friend.
• Community-biased Distribution, considers also the het-
erogeneity of altruism towards different people. It as-
sumes that people in a community have greater incentives
to carry messages for the other members in the same
community and less incentives to carry messages for
people outside the community. Hence, we model the
altruism on each node using two variables, a and e,
for intra-community and inter-community altruism, re-
spectively. For convenient presentation later, we would
use (0.7,0.1) to represent 0.7 probability to carry data
for intra-community and 0.1 for carrying data for inter-
community.
Experimental data set Cambridge Infocom05 Infocom06 Reality
Device iMote iMote iMote Phone
Network type Bluetooth Bluetooth Bluetooth Bluetooth
Duration (days) 11 3 3 246
Granularity (seconds) 600 120 120 300
Number of experimental devices 54 41 98 97
Number of internal contacts 10,873 22,459 191,336 54,667
Average no. of contacts/pair/day 0.345 4.6 6.7 0.024
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Fig. 1. Delivery ratio of four datasets with percentages of selfish nodes
B. Traffic Models
Here we assume asynchronous communication for the ap-
plication scenario. In principle, each node on the network can
create messages for any other nodes, but we want to see the
impact of different communication patterns. At the beginning
of the simulation, each node will pick its list of destination
nodes for communication using some communication pattern
distribution. We analyse uniform and community-biased traffic
from a source for the communication pattern.
• Uniform Traffic: The source-destination pairs are uni-
formly distributed throughout the whole population. In
this case, each node has the same probability to commu-
nicate with all other nodes, and there is no bias for the
traffic.
• Community-biased Traffic: Each node tend to communi-
cate more with people inside their community and less
with people in other communities [17]. This traffic pattern
is determined by two parameters Pintra and Pinter,
where Pintra is the probability of generating traffic for
community members and Pinter is the probability for
inter-community communication. Pintra + Pinter = 1.
Uniform traffic assumes an equal communication opportu-
nity for each node pair, but in real life a person will not talk to
the whole population with the same probability. Community-
biased traffic is more realistic in that it assumes heterogeneity
in communication pattern. We also analysed Geometric Traffic
(each node creates messages for other nodes with a probability
decreasing geometrically from the source), but since the results
are heavily biased toward the first hop and will not involve any
altruism distribution so we will not include the results in this
paper.
IV. RESULTS AND EVALUATIONS
The evaluation in this section is mainly focused on the
robustness of the real human mobility traces under different
altruism distributions. We also look at the possible impact
of the traffic patterns on overall system throughput. Since
not all the datasets we can access have a priori community
information, we concentrate here on the robustness of the
mobile networks under different altruism distributions. We
study community-biased traffic in the next section with static
social network models.
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Fig. 2. Delivery ratio with uniform traffic on Reality data
Figure 1 shows the delivery ratio of the four datasets
with the percentage of selfish nodes in the system. It seems
that the delivery ratio decreases linearly with the percentage
of selfish nodes. It is less tolerant to selfish nodes than
the static network cases, but it makes sense here that the
delivery ratio of a mobile network is proportional to the
number of users participating in the system. Figure 2 and
Figure 3 show the delivery ratio of the Reality and Cambridge
datasets, respectively. Each graph shows the delivery ratio
under all-altruistic, normal, uniform, high-degree-biased, and
low-degree-biased altruism distribution. The x-axis shows the
TTL of each message, which is the time each message can
stay in the system (messages will be removed if they stay in
the system over their specific TTL) and hence also indirectly
reflects the delays of the deliveries. From both figures, we can
see that normal, uniform, and high-degree-biased distributions
yield very similar delivery ratios (their confidence intervals
are almost overlapping). In addition the delivery ratios of
these distributions are very close to the performance of the
“All Altruistic” case, especially for the Cambridge datasets. 3
The low-degree-biased case has lower delivery ratio in both
cases. It seems that high degree nodes are more important for
improving the system throughput. This matches the previous
study that the node betweenness centrality values are highly
correlated with the node degree in these mobility traces [12].
But even for this worst case, the delivery is still no less than
half of “All Altruistic” for low TTL case and 68% for the
Reality and 87% for the Cambridge data. Similar results also
observed in other datasets.
Figure 4 shows the delivery ratio for the Cambridge and
MIT Reality datasets with varying intra- and inter-community
altruism. For Cambridge, we have a priori information about
the grouping; for Reality, we use community detection al-
gorithm to cluster them, which may not be ideal but can
still provide some insights. We set the TTL to one day for
Cambridge and one week for Reality, respectively, to produce
reasonable delivery ratios (see Fig. 3 and Fig. 2). We increases
the altruism value at 0.1 per step. From Figure 4 we can
3The delivery ratio of the Reality dataset is generally low even with TTL up
to one week. This is because many participants switched off their Bluetooth
transceivers, which makes the network very sparse. Since the dataset lasts for
9 months (the longest available dataset) it still makes a good subject for social
network study, and we include it here.
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Fig. 3. Delivery ratio with uniform traffic on Cambridge data
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Fig. 4. Delivery ratio of Cambridge and Reality data with varying intra- and
inter-community altruism
see that there is no impact from intra-community altruism
but only from inter-community altruism (see the horizontal
stripes on the figures), and the increase in delivery ratio is not
very significant (from 0.58 to 0.62 for Cambridge, and 0.34
to 0.40 for Reality). The main reason is that a large fraction
of deliveries are for nodes within the same community, so
that even the intra-community altruism value is low; because
of many intra-community contacts, the delivery ratio is still
reasonable high with 0.1 altruism. Further increase in intra-
community altruism value will not improve the delivery within
the same communities with that large value of time-TTL, but
increase in inter-community altruism will increase the chance
of spreading the message to other communities. We have
plotted the graph when time-TLL equal to three hours for the
Cambridge case. The intra-community altruism is dominant in
this case and we observed vertical stripes, but the differences
in delivery ratio from altruism equal to 0.1 to 1.0 are still
not very significant (from 0.22 to 0.27). These results further
show the robustness of the opportunistic network because of
the presence of multiple forwarding paths.
V. EVALUATION USING SOCIAL NETWORK MODELS
Human mobility traces are ideal for mobile network studies,
but due to the limitations of mobility experiments (e.g. high
equipment cost and difficulty in recruiting volunteers), there
are very few traces available. In order to draw a more general
conclusions, and to be able to study community-biased traffic,
we choose to use static social network topologies and simulate
asynchronous messaging in the network. This approach is
very popularly used in evolutionary biology to understand the
impact of the underlying network topology. We consider this
approach here because, as it is well known in sociology [18],
where altruism is closely dependent on kinship and social
relationship. Whether people would sacrifice their batteries to
relay messages for others is likely to depend on the social
links between the requesters and the requested nodes. Hence,
by using social network models, we can simulate message
spreading in the system with different altruism distributions
and communication traffic patterns.
Here we study information dissemination on two different
topologies popularly used in modeling human social net-
works, namely, the Caveman model [21], and the Kumpula
model [13]. In the simulation, we use asynchronous messag-
ing on these generated topologies. We set the Time-to-Live
(TTL) value of all messages to the diameter of the current
network. The diameter of a network is the longest shortest-
path between any two vertices in the network. Each source
node broadcasts its message to its neighbours only once. If a
node receives a message of zero TTL value, it will drop the
message irrespective of the node’s current altruistic state. If
the TTL of the received message is greater than zero, and the
message has not been relayed by this node before, the node
will decide whether to relay this message to its neighbours
according to its altruistic state. A message may arrive at
the same node multiple times. This is similar to epidemic
routing [20] but with a limit on spread. We are interested
in know how the choice of altruism distribution changes the
message dissemination.
A. Social Network Models
1) Caveman Model: The caveman model is a way to
construct graphs with communities proposed by Watts [21].
A graph is built starting from K fully connected graphs
(representing communities living in isolation, like primitive
men in caves). According to this model, every edge of the
initial network is re-wired to point to a node of another cave
with a certain probability p. The re-wiring process is used to
represent random interconnections between the communities.
Individuals of one cave are closely connected, whereas pop-
ulations belonging to different caves are sparsely connected.
Therefore, the social networks generated using this model are
characterized by a high clustering coefficient and low average
path length. It has been proved that this model is able to
reproduce social structures very close to real ones [21].
2) Kumpula Model: Kumpula et al. [13] present a network
model where the weights are generated dynamically and
they shape the developing topology. The Kumpula model is
characterised by two attachment schemes, the local attachment
(LA) where links are added between neighbour nodes, and the
global attachment (GA) where links are added between nodes
pairs further away on the topology. The local attachment is
based on the concepts that people have closer relationship
in social life have higher chance of socialising with each
other again and also he fact of mutual friends/encounters
(e.g. birthday parties) in social life. The global attachment
is based on the concept of meeting random people outside
the current social circle in the daily life. The Kumpula model
also implements the node deletion (ND) mechanism, where
some nodes are removed and replace with new nodes, which
is similar to the forgotten process of social life (some friends
Community generation model Caveman Kumpula
Number of nodes 1000 1000
Number of edges 4500 4511
Diameter 10 7
Clustering coefficient 0.7399 0.2965
Max degree 13 33
Number of communities 48 17
Average size of communities 20.8333 58.8235
TABLE II
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOCIAL TOPOLOGIES
leave the current social circle and new friends join in). Details
can be found in [13].
Table II summarises the characteristics of the two models
we used in this paper. In order for the topologies to be
comparable to each other, we keep the number of nodes to
be approximately equal to 1,000 and the number of edges to
be approximately equal to 4,500 with an average of 4.5 friends
for each node in a total population of 1,000.
After the generation of the topologies, a community detec-
tion algorithm proposed by Clauset et al. is applied to split
the topologies into communities, using modularity optimiza-
tion [6].
B. Results
We first evaluate the delivery ratio of Caveman and
Kumpula models with uniform and normal altruism distri-
butions. With uniform and normal altruism distributions, the
delivery ratios for Kumpula model are all above 0.90 irre-
spective of the percentages of biased traffic within the same
communities. Caveman model has slightly different property
due to its large number of communities, the delivery ratio
increase slightly from 0.75 to 0.91 in the uniform case and
from 0.80 to 0.92 in the normal case when the percentage of
community traffic increases from 0% to 100%.
To investigate the different impacts of intra-community
altruism and inter-community altruism, we vary the intra-
community altruistic value a and inter-community altruistic
value e and observe the change in the delivery ratio of the
system. We plot the contour graphs of the delivery ratio for
all values of a and e between 0 and 1. Figure 5 shows the
contour graphs for the Caveman model with four different
community-biased traffic models, with community traffic (Pc)
equal to 0, 0.3, 0.7, and 1.0, respectively. When Pc = 0,
it is obvious that inter-community altruism has larger impact
on the overall delivery of the system (we can see from the
dominance of the horizontal stripes). Intra-community altruism
starts to help improve the performance of the system when the
inter-community altruism grows above 0.4. A combination of
around (0.4, 0.6) can almost guarantee 100% delivery. The
Pc = 0.3 case is quite similar to the Pc = 0 case except that
intra-community altruism starts to show its effect sooner, so
we see some changes in the low delivery region. The high
delivery region (above 0.55) remains more or less the same.
The empty area (delivery above 95%) remains similar. When
Pc = 0.7, the high delivery region (delivery ratio about 0.55)
is much bigger than the previous two cases. The minimum
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Fig. 5. Delivery ratio of the Caveman model with varying intra- and inter-
community altruism
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Fig. 6. Delivery ratio of the Kumpula model with varying intra- and inter-
community altruism
delivery ratio is now 0.35 instead of 0.05 in the Pc = 0 case.
Intra-community altruism becomes much more dominant in
the Pc = 1 case (we can see the vertical stripes dominate the
entire graph). Figure 6 shows the same cases for the Kumpula
model. It follows a similar trend as the Caveman model, but
we can say that the Kumpula topology is less sensitive to
the traffic models since the changes are not so significant
compared with the Caveman model. This can be explained by
the fact that the Caveman model has much more communities
than the Kumpula model.
To compare with non-social graphs, We also evaluate mes-
sage spreading on the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) [3] and scale-free
(SF) models [2], which are two popular random graph models.
Both models have minimal response to the change of traffic
pattern, and there is almost no change from Pc = 0 to
Pc = 0.7. This is because they are actually not good social
network models.
A conclusion we can draw from the results of the static
models is that information dissemination on the social network
topologies is quite robust toward the altruism distribution.
Topology has little influence on delivery ratio if the altru-
ism follows uniform and normal distributions. Traffic pattern
has significant impact if the altruism distribution is also
community-biased. In this case, the topologies are even more
robust towards altruism distribution.
VI. RELATED WORK
Altruistic behavior has been well studied in the literature
using a game theory approach. For example [15] and [14]
model players’ payoff as the altruism coefficients of them-
selves and also what they believe their opponents’ coefficient
to be. We do not model the gaming behavior of nodes in
our system; instead, we are more interested in the system
throughput when the system reached its steady state distri-
bution. Therefore, we assumed static distributions of altruism
for our study and will look at the more dynamic gaming
strategies in future. [5] studies the price of anarchy of traffic
routing under the assumption that users are partially altruistic.
They show that if all users have a coefficient of altruism
β > 0, then the price of anarchy is bounded by 1/β. The
altruism model in this paper follows an incentive (utility)
approach as introduced by [14]. They assume the utility of
each player is a linear combination of his own a priori payoff
and the payoffs of other players. Again, we do not focus
on how a particular distribution of altruism is induced by a
certain kind of incentive of the nodes, but study the result
of the system with the already formed distribution. Altruism
has also been studied in cooperative services. [1] describes
a general approach to construct cooperative services, which
tolerate Byzantine, Altruistic, and Rational behavior. Altruistic
nodes in the system are the nodes which follow the suggested
protocol exactly, hence they are not a challenging point for the
protocol design. In P2P research, Piatek et al. have explored
altruistic behavior in BitTorrent empirically [19]. They found
that high capacity peers send much faster than the minimal
rate required for reciprocation, similarly to our high degree-
biased altruism modeling. Our work focuses on evaluating the
performance of information dissemination in social networks
and mobile networks with selfish or partially altruistic nodes,
and we could not find this type of study is in the prior
literature.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Opportunistic communication and information dissemina-
tion in social networks are surprisingly robust toward the form
of altruism distribution, largely due to their multiple forward-
ing paths. This supports the case for building opportunistic
networking applications in terms of one human factor. In this
work, we only consider the static altruism distribution at the
steady state. It would be interesting to study the altruism
values resulting from gaming strategies and feedback from
prior delivery history to the future. Currently, we assume each
user will not memorise its own previous rejection history for
message delivery of other nodes. In the future, we can study
variations of this. For example, limit the number of delivery
requests for a single user to avoid excessive requests, which
can result in higher delivery. One more thing that would be
interesting to look at would be the power consumption of
nodes, and how it is affected by altruism, for example to see
how much power a node might save by choosing to be selfish
compared with being only altruistic within its community.
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